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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE} OF PROCEEDINGS
In

addition

to

the

jurisdictional

grounds

cited

by

appellant, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 4A, Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals, in that the Supreme Court has
poured-over this case to the Court of Appeals for disposition.

This is a suit for breach of contract originally filed by
the

plaintiff

in

November 1986.

the

Third

(R-002).

Judicial

District

Court

on

14

Thereafter and subsequent to partial

discovery in the matter. Defendant State Farm moved for summary
judgment, (R-042) , and the motion was granted on 7 August 1987,
(R-107-110).

On 27 August 1987, the court entered its findings

of uncontroverted fact, conclusions of law, and summary judgment
against the plaintiff.
of

appeal

(R-115-116).

with

the

(R-lll-114) . Plaintiff filed its notice
Supreme

Court

on

24

September

1987.

On 3 December 1987, the case was poured-over to the

Court of Appeals for disposition.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Were the affidavits submitted by plaintiff sufficient to
create an issue of fact as to when negotiations ceased or do they
contain but unsubstantiated conclusions?
2. Is the mere resubmission of an insurance claim a form of
negotiation?
3. Was plaintiff led to believe that its claim would in
- 1-

fact be reconsidered?
4.

Did

State

Farm,

through

its

agent

Richard

G. Webb,

encourage or instigate the resubmission of plaintiff's claim?
5.

Is the one-year

contractual

limitation

period

tolled

pending formal denial of the claim by the insurer, or does it
begin to run on the date of loss as the "crystal clear" language
of the policy indicates?
6.

Did

limitation

State

Farm waive

provision

by

enforcement

engaging

in

of

the

negotiations

contractual
after

the

one-year period had run?
7*

Is State Farm precluded from asserting the contractual

limitation

defense

by

reason

of

its

failure

to

affirmatively

plead it, even though plaintiff was given adequate notice of the
defense and had an opportunity to meet it?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS
N/A
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a suit for breach of contract originally filed by
the plaintiff in the Third Judicial District Court on 14 November
1986 •

(R-002).

Thereafter and subsequent to partial discovery

in the matter. Defendant State Farm moved for summary judgment,
(R-042) ,

and

(R-107-110) .

the

motion

was

granted

on

7

August

1987,

On 27 August 1987, the court entered its findings

of uncontroverted fact, conclusions of law, and summary judgment

- 2 -

against the plaintiff.
of

appeal

with

(R-115-116).

the

(R-lll-114).
Supreme

Plaintiff filed its notice

Court

on

24

September

1987.

On 3 December 1987, the case was poured-over to the

Court of Appeals for disposition.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Hedman Investments, Inc. acquired a business office policy
of insurance from State Farm on 3 January 1984.

(R-016, 111).

Hedman Investments, Inc., at all relevant times, was located at
948 East 7145 South, Suite 104, Midvale, Utah.

(R-017, 111). On

25 July 1985, a fire occurred at the Creekview Apartments, which
are owned and operated by Hedman Investments, but which are
located at 961, 963 and 965 East South Union, Midvale, Utah.
(R-017, 112). A claim was filed by Hedman Investments with State
Farm concerning lost rents at the Creekview Apartments on 28
January 1986.

(R-017, 112). State Farm denied the claim on 7

March 1986, because the loss occurred at the Creekview Apartments
and not at the insured's
business.

(R-017).

(i.e., Hedman Investments1) place of

Plaintiff thereafter brought suit against

State Farm for breach of the insurance contract, alleging that an
agent

of

State

Farm

had

told

Hedman

Investments

that

the

insurance policy would not only cover loss of income at its place
of business, the office, but would also qover lost rents at the
Creekview Apartments.

(R-017-018).

Hedman Investments was only

paying an annual premium of $80.00 for the subject policy.

- 3 -

(R-018).

The

suit

was

filed

on

14

November

1986,

(R-002) ,

approximately sixteen months after the fire had occurred.

State

Farm thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment which assumes
for purposes of the motion that the lost rents were covered by
the

subject policy.

The motion was based

on the

following

condition which is contained in the policy:
No action shall be brought unless there has been
compliance with the policy provisions . . . and the
action is started within one year after the
occurrence causing loss or damage.
(R-030) (emphasis added).

State Farm argued that plaintiff's suit was barred because
plaintiff failed to bring the action "within one year after the
occurrence

[the fire] causing

loss or damage."

(R-016-020).

State Farm relied on four Utah decisions which clearly sustained
such a proposition.

Plaintiff countered by arguing, inter alia, that State Farm
had waived enforcement of the contractual limitation provision by
continuing to engage in negotiations with plaintiff regarding its
claim after the one-year period had run.

(R-090-104).

Plaintiff

submitted two affidavits in support of this contention, but the
court

found

them

to

insufficient to create

be
a

simply

conclusory

question of fact.
- 4 -

See

and

therefore

Transcript of

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at paqe 14, lines 8 - 9 .
Plaintiff then argued that a form of negotiation occurred when
plaintiff resubmitted its claim with State Farm during the latter
part of the summer of 1985.

The court ruled that the mere

resubmission of an insurance claim, absent some assurance by the
insurance company that the claim would indeed be reconsidered, is
not a form of negotiation.
"admit[ted] there

(R-108-109, 113).

Plaintiff then

[were] no other facts upon which it [could]

rely to claim waiver or estoppel,"

(R-108); consequently, the

court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The affidavits submitted by plaintiff are insufficient in
that they fail to indicate whether State Farm actually re-opened
negotiations with plaintiff or simply reaffirmed its previous
denial when plaintiff resubmitted its claim.
because

as

stated

by

the

Maryland

This is critical

Court

of

Appeals,

11

'negotiation' connotes something more than the flat refusal of a

simple request."
1967).

Brown v. Bradshaw, 226 A.2d

565, 569

(Md.

If each time plaintiff "contacted" or "discussed" its

claim with State Farm, State Farm simply reaffirmed its previous
denial of the claim, no negotiations took place and hence no
waiver of the contractual limitation period.

"Negotiation" is

simply not a unilateral process as plaintiff would have this
Court believe.

It is a process of "mutual arrangement.

- 5-

discussionf
(1966).
offers

and

bargaining."

65A

C.J.S.

Negotiate

at

1078

It is a process that involves not only the submission of
[claims] but the consideration of offers as well.

C.J.S. Negotiation (Supp. 1987).
refusal of a simple request."

66

It is much more than the "flat

Brown, 226 A.2d at 569. Moreover,

plaintiff concedes that its claim never was reconsidered by State
Farm.

(R-077-078) .

original denial."

At all times State Farm "[stood] on its

(R-088).

Plaintiff's counsel, however, argues that State Farm Agent
Richard G. Webb encouraged or instiqated the resubmission of
plaintiff's claim, but there is absolutely nothing in the facts
that would indicate that this occurred.

The affidavit of John G.

Hedman simply states that Mr. Webb "assist[ed]

[plaintiff] in

presenting

(R-077).

language

the
is

claim

again

"assist[ed],"

to

not

State

Farm."

"encouraged"

or

The

"instigated."

Moreover, to argue that plaintiff was led to believe that its
claim would again be scrutinized by State Farm is simply without
merit.

To the contrary, plaintiff was told on at least three

separate occasions that it "wouldn't do . . .

a bit of good" to

file even its original claim with State Farm since there was
clearly no coverage with respect to the fire which occurred at
the Creekview Apartments.

Deposition of John G. Hedman, page

120, line 14 - page 125, line 17; Deposition of Richard G. Webb,
page 63, line 14 - page 64, line 14; page 68, lines 1 1 - 1 6 .

- 6 -

Because there was no waiver of the limitation provision, it
must be enforced as written.
loss and
insurer.

It begins I to run on the date of

is not tolled pending denial of the claim by the
This is the law in Utah.

Finally, since plaintiff was given notice of State Farm's
intention to rely on the contractual limitation provision 44 days
prior to argument on the motion, and had an opportunity to meet
it. State Farm should not be precluded from raising the defense
by reason of its failure to affirmatively plead it.

All the

rules of procedure require is notice of the issue raised and an
opportunity to meet it.
1963) .

Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah

Plaintiff would have had no more notice had State Farm

formally moved to amend its answer.

ARGUMENT
I.

Summary Judgment was properly granted because there were
no genuine issues as to any material fact.
A.

The affidavits submitted by plaintiff merely
contain unsubstantiated conclusions and naked
assertions and are therefore insufficient to
create an issue of fact.

In Massey v. Utah Power & Light, 60^ P.2d 937 (Utah 1980),
the Supreme Court held that the lower court had properly granted
summary judgment in U.P. & L.'s favor because, inter alia, the
affidavits

submitted

by

the

plaintiff

contained

assertions of negligence," stating as follows:

- 7 -

but

"naked

A motion for summary judgment is an effective means
of ascertaining the existence of undisputed facts
that will support a judgment as a matter of law and
thus avoid the necessity of trial.
Of course,
summary
judgment
is appropriate
only
if the
pleadings,
depositions,
affidavits,
and
other
submissions of the parties reflect that there is no
genuine issue of a material fact. However, bare
contentions, unsupported by any specification of
facts in support thereof, raise no material questions
of fact as will preclude the entry of summary
judgment.
Id. at 938.
Moreover, in Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d

723, 725 (Utah

1985) , the Supreme Court again enunciated the same principle:
"An affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated
conclusions

and

which

fails

to

state

evidentiary

facts

is

submitted

by

insufficient to create an issue of fact."

State

Farm

contends

that

the

affidavits

plaintiff are simply conclusory and as such are insufficient to
create an issue of fact.

The affidavit of William G. Gibbs simply states that he and
"representatives of Defendant State Farm continued to negotiate
and discuss Plaintiff's
(R-071).

claim

. • . after July

26, 1986."

However, as correctly noted by the court below, this is

but a mere conclusion reached by the affiant.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 3 - 1 5 .

- 8 -

Transcript of

During the hearing on State Farm's motioh for summary judgment,
the court queried plaintiff's counsel as follows:

THE COURT: Is there anything in the record any
place where they re-opened negotiation? Is there any
sworn testimony? It is one thing to say, "Well, you
know, we contacted the insurance company and there
was continual contact." But what if every time you
called on the phone you say, "We cjon't want to talk
to you. We have denied it already, it is over with."
And that is the only thing thetre is.
Is there
anything in the record from the sworn testimony that
State Farm, after its letter of denial, re-opened its
thinking and negotiated?
MR. NELSON: Your Honor, al]| I can point the
Court to are the statements in Mr. Gibbs1 affidavit.
I will direct the Court to those paragraphs, if the
Court wishes.
I believe it is paragraph four.
Paragraph four in the name of Mr. Gibbs1 affidavit.
THE COURT:

Read us that paragraph.

MR. NELSON:
I will do that.
"Thereafter,
Affiant had several conversations with the State
Department of Insurance relating to such matter.
Furthermore, Affiant had conversations with counsel
and representatives of State Farm insurance regarding
settlement
of
plaintiff's
claii|a.
Conversations
occurred after July 25, 1986. At no time during any
such post-July 26, 1986, conversations with agents of
Defendant State Farm Insurance Company, did any agent
or representative inform Affiant that the limitation
period contained in the policy of insurance would be
exercised.
To
the
contrary,
agents
and
representatives of Defendant State Farm Insurance
continued to negotiate and discuss Plaintiff's claim
with Affiant after July 26, 1986."
THE COURT: That is a conclusion that has been
reached
in
the
affidavit,
that
there
was
a
negotiation.
Is there anyplace Where anyone from
State Farm actually said, well — they actually made
statements that did, in fact, re-open negotiations?
MR. NELSON:
I will point the Court to the
letter of Mr. Webb who is, as I have pointed out to
the Court, an agent of the Defendant State Farm.
That letter is dated September 29, 1986, and is
attached as Exhibit E.
- 9 -

THE COURT: And what pertinent part of that do
you think is important?
MR. NELSON: I think it is important that he
indicates there he has stated they are going to stand
on the original denial of the claim at this time due
to the fact they feel there is no commitment, I
believe there was. I was under the impression there
was language there disclosing a reconsideration of
the claim.
THE COURT:

Is it in there or isn't it?

MR. NELSON:
Honor.

I don't see it in this letter. Your

Id.

The Affidavit of William
evidentiary

facts"

upon

which

G. Gibbs
is

"fails to

based

negotiations occurred after July 25, 1986.
v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 725.

the

state the

assertion

that

See, supra, Williams

The affidavit fails to state whether

State Farm actually re-opened negotiations with plaintiff or
simply reaffirmed its previous denial of plaintiff's claim.

This

is important because as stated by the Maryland Court of Appeals
in

Brown

v.

Bradshaw,

226

A.2d

565,

569

(Md.

1967),

"'negotiations' connotes something more than the flat refusal of
a simple request."

Volume 65A of C.J.S.

Negotiate at 1078

(1966) expounds by defining the term "negotiate" as meaning "to
procure by mutua1 intercourse and agreement with another; . . .
to bring about by mutual arrangement, discussion, or bargaining."
(Emphasis added.)

Therefore, if during the post-July 25, 1986

conversations between Mr. Gibbs and representatives

of State

Farm, State Farm simply reaffirmed its previous denial, no mutual
- 10 -

intercourse, arrangement, discussion, or bargaining occurred—
hence no negotiation.

"Negotiation" simply is not a unilateral

process as plaintiff would have the Court Relieve.

Since the affidavit of William G. Gibbs contains but bare
contentions, unsupported by any evidence indicating that State
Farm actually re-opened negotiations regarding plaintiff's claim,
i

the affidavit is insufficient to create an issue of fact.

For similar reasons the affidavit of John G. Hedman is also
insufficient
affidavit

to

does

create
Mr.

an

issue

Hedman

state

of

fact.

that

Nowhere

State

re-opened negotiations and reconsidered his claim.

Farm

in

actually

In fact this

was conceded by plaintiff's counsel during oral arguments.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question again.
Is there any statement made by Mr. Webb that we have
here under oath, any statement tha : he made that in
any way indicated that State Farm was now going to go
ahead with negotiations?
MR. NELSON:
view, yes.

I think from the insured's point of

THE COURT: I don't care wfyat the insured's
point of view is. Every person has something in
their own mind. I know your position so far is the
agent told the insured, "I will resubmit the claim or
I will contact the company to s\ee if they will
reconsider." Now, is there anything other than that
that the agent said to the insured that would
indicate that State Farm has reconsidered and now
moving ahead to renegotiate it?
MR. NELSON: I don't know of anything, Your
Honor. I do think those are significant, if the
Court will bear out for just a moment. Bear with me.
- 11 -

his

because the reason I think it is important from the
insured's point of view, at least, as to what a
reasonable
person
would
infer
from
those
circumstances, is because the real issue we are
talking about is whether or not, under the
circumstances of the case, it is just inequitable to
allow the one year period which is discovered in the
law quite widely.
It is in derogation of the
statutory period.
In view of that underlying sort of matrix, what
that person reasonably infers from the actions of the
agent of the companv is important whether or not he
goes ahead and files a lawsuit.
THE COURT: There is no question about that. I
am bearing down on Webb. I just need your strongest
point in order to analyze this myself. I know your
position is that he, in behalf of the insured,
recontacted State Farm to see if they would
reconsider their denial. Now, other than that, were
there any other statements that he made to your
insured?
MR. NELSON:

I am not aware of any.

THE COURT: That would lead your insurer [sic]
to believe that State Farm had indeed reconsidered or
was going to renegotiate with him.
MR. NELSON:

I am not aware of any. Your Honor.

I think there is also a substantial
question of fact as to whether or not there were
negotiations ongoing that should prevent, I think,
the averments in the affidavits. Although they may
be comments. Your Honor, do raise before this court a
substantial question of material fact as to whether
or not negotiations were ongoing. That in and of
itself, that question of fact as to when negotiations
stopped.
THE COURT: That is why I asked you that here
today. I see that as the key issue. That is the
reason I asked you. Is there anything else, any
other sworn facts other than the statement by Webb,
"I will contact the company and see if they will
reconsider"?
MR. NELSON:

No. As I indicated to the Court, I
- 12 -

am not aware of any.
Transcript of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 18-20f
26-27.
The affidavit of John G. Hedman contains but bare assertions
and unsubstantiated conclusions.

At no place in his affidavit

does he state that State Farm actually re-^opened negotiations and
agreed to reconsider his claim.

And that is precisely what

negotiation is. As stated in 66 C.J.S. Negotiation (Supp. 1987),
"'Negotiation' is a process of submission and consideration of
offers [claims] until an acceptable offer is made and accepted."
(Emphasis added.)
discussion

Moreover, "negotiation" is "[a] process of

in which both or all parties

express or exhibit

interest in a common objective and attemptl to resolve differences
with

the

mutual

end

of

agreement."

[id.

(emphasis

added).

Therefore, since the affidavit of John G. Hedman, like the
affidavit of William G. Gibbs, fails to state whether State Farm
actually

re-opened

interest

in

stricken

as

create

an

reconsidering
conclusory

issue

of

and

negotiations
his
and

fact

as

cla im,
deemid
correctly

displayed
it

an

should

be

insufficient

to

ruled

by

the

court below.

Nor is plaintiff entitled to a reasonable inference that
negotiations occurred.

To the contrary, all competent evidence

indicates that State Farm simply reaffirmed its previous denial.
In responding to plaintiff's request

- 13 -

for

reconsideration. State

Farm, through its agent Richard G. Webb, stated that it was going
"to

stand

on

Moreover,

[its] original

plaintiff

reconsideration

of

denial

concedes

of

that

[his] claim."

the

State

claim."

Farm

(R-077-078).

(R-088).

"den[ied]

any

Therefore, the

facts without question indicate that plaintiff's claim was never
reconsidered,

that negotiations were

never

re-opened.

At all

times State Farm "[stood] on its original denial." (R-088).

B.

The "resubmission of a claim" cannot be
equated with negotiation or the
"reconsideration of a claim" as argued by
plaintiff in its brief.

To hold that the mere resubmission of a claim is a form of
negotiation would make negotiation in this instance a unilateral
event, which it definitely is not.
"negotiate" has been defined

As argued, supra, the term

as meaning

"to procure by mutual

intercourse and agreement with another; . . .
mutual

arrangement,

Negotiate at 1078

discussion,

or

to bring about by

bargaining."

(1966) (emphasis added).

65A

C.J.S.

"'Negotiation' is a

process of submission and consideration of offers [claims]."
C.J.S. Negotiation

(Supp. 1987)

process of discussion

(emphasis added).

in which both

66

It is "[a]

. . . parties express or

exhibit interest in a common objective and attempt to resolve
differences with the mutual end of agreement."
added).

Because

discussion
refusal

of

and
a

the

term

bargaining,
simple

"negotiation"

courts

request"

is

Brown, 226 A.2d at 569.
- 14 -

have
not

a

Id., (emphasis

connotes

held

that

form

of

the

mutual
"flat

negotiation.

In the case sub judice there was no mutual discussion or
bargaining with reference to plaintiff's resubmitted claim, but
rather a flat refusal of reconsideration -- hence no negotiation.

Moreover,

in

Anderson

v.

Beneficial

Fire

and

Casualty

Company, 21 Utah 2d 173, 442 P.2d 933 (1968) the Supreme Court of
Utah was confronted with this very issue and held that the mere
resubmission of an insurance claim cannot be equated with a
reconsideration

of that claim.

Rather there must have been

assurances that the claim would indeed be reconsidered.

See id.

at 934.

As

previously

noted,

there

werfe

no

assurances

of

reconsideration in the case sub judice hiut rather only a flat
refusal of reconsideration.

Plaintiff's counsel seeks to circumvent the court's ruling
in Anderson

v.

Beneficial

by

(1) suggesting

that Mr. Webb

encouraged or instigated the resubmission of plaintiff's claim,
and (2) by arguing that plaintiff was led to believe that its
claim would indeed by reconsidered.
counsel's
nothing

suggestions
in

the

to

record

the

which

However, despite plaintiff's

contrary,! there
would

indicate

is

absolutely

that

Mr. Webb

encouraged or instigated the resubmission of plaintiff's claim.
The affidavit

of John G.

Hedman merely
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states that

Mr. Webb

"assist[ed] [plaintiff] in presenting the claim again to State
Farm for reconsideration,"

(R-077), and is devoid of anything

which would suggest that Mr. Webb instigated or encouraged a
resubmission of the claim.

Moreover, plaintiff's contention that

it was led to believe that its claim would again be scrutinized
and reconsidered by State Farm is simply without merit.

Nothing

in the facts suggests that plaintiff was led to believe that its
claim would be reconsidered; plaintiff was not encouraged to
refile, nor

did

State

Farm

negotiations

and

again

indicate

consider

that

it would

plaintiff's

claim.

re-open
To

the

contrary, the record indicates that plaintiff was informed on at
least three separate occasions that it "wouldn't do . . .
of good"

to

file even

its original

claim with

a bit

State Farm.

Deposition of John G. Hedman, page 120, line 14 - page 125, line
17; Deposition of Richard G. Webb, page 63, line 14 - page 64,
line 14; page 68, line 11-line 16.
would

indicate

that

the

And there is nothing which

circumstances

were

any

different

concerning the second claim.

Because the references to negotiations in the affidavits
submitted

by

plaintiff

are

but

conclusory, and

because

the

unilateral act of resubmitting a claim with an insurer is not a
form of negotiation, summary judgment was properly granted since
there existed no genuine issues as to any material fact.
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II.

Summary Judgment was also properly granted because
State Farm was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A.

The law in Utah is that one-year contractual
limitation periods, which are commonly found in
insurance contracts, are valid and enforceable and
are not tolled or suspended pending denial of the
claim by the insurer but rather commence to run as
written on the date of loss, although they may be
deemed waived if the insurer fails to deny the
claim in a timely fashion and continues to engage
in negotiations after the period has run.

Plaintiff argues what was rejected by our Supreme Court some
twenty years ago in the case of Anderson v. Beneficial Fire and
Casualty

Company,

Plaintiff's

21

argument

Utah

2d

is that

173,

the

should be tolled until the claim

^42

one-year

P.2d

933

limitation

(1968).
period

is formally denied by the

insurer, i.e., that the period does not begin to run on the date
of loss as the "crystal clear" language of the policy indicates,
but rather commences to run only when the claim is formally
denied.

Plaintiff interestingly cites Anderson v. Beneficial in

support of this proposition but fails ^o specify that he is
quoting from the dissent.

See Brief of Appellant at 11, 16.

What the Court actually held in Anderson v. Beneficial was that
the

language

used

in

the

limitation

provision

was

"crystal

clear," that the period was not tolled pending denial of the
claim but rather commenced to run on the date of loss, and that a
denial by the insurer three weeks prior to the one-year deadline
was timely since that provided the insured with "ample time"
within which to file suit.

442 P.2d at 93 3.
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Moreover, as recently as 1983 the Supreme Court has cited
Anderson v. Beneficial for support in holding that the limitation
period commences to run on the date of loss and that a denial by
an insurer 60 days prior to the one-year deadline is timely.

See

Hibdon v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 657 P.2d 1358 (Utah 1983).

Since the limitation period begins to run on the date of
loss,

herein

July

25,

1985,

and

since

State

Farm

denied

plaintiff's claim some four and one-half months prior to the
one-year deadline, leaving plaintiff with more than ample time
within which to bring the action, plaintiff's suit was properly
dismissed because it neglected to file the suit until November
14, 1986, sixteen months after "the occurrence causing loss or
damage."

See policy (R-030).

Plaintiff next argues that State Farm waived the limitation
provision

by

continuing

to

negotiate

with

plaintiff

until

September 29, 1986, and cites Anderson v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company, 583 P. 2d 101 (Utah 1978) for the proposition
that an insured is to be given a reasonable time within which to
bring suit after termination of negotiations.

Although the law

cited by plaintiff is correct, the facts are not.

As argued in

Section I of this brief, there is absolutely nothing in the
record which would

indicate that State Farm negotiated with

plaintiff after March 7, 1986, the date on which it denied
plaintiff's

claim.

During all subsequent
- 18 -

conversations. State

Farm

simply

reaffirmed

its

previous

denial.

Moreover,

the

unilateral act of resubmitting a claim, especially when told that
"it wouldn't do a bit of good," simply cannot be equated with
negotiation, which involves mutual intercourse, discussion, and
bargaining.

Plaintiff was not encouraged to re-file.

Therefore, summary

judgment was properly granted by the

court below because there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and State Farm was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

III.

In the interests of justice. State Farm should not be
precluded from asserting the contractual limitation
defense by reason of its failure to affirmatively
plead said defense because plaintiff was given
adequate notice of the defense and had an opportunity
to meet it.

In Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963), the
plaintiff argued that the defendants should not be allowed to
rely upon a subsequent agreement which purportedly superseded and
replaced the agreement upon which the lawsuit was brought since
the defendants had failed to plead the subsequent agreement as an
affirmative defense.

The Supreme Court responded as follows:

Plaintiff also raises the procedural point that
since defendants did not plead the subsequent
agreement as an affirmative defense, they should not
have been permitted to rely thereon. It is true, as
plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), ip.R.C.P., requires
that affirmative defenses be pleaded. It is a good
rule whose purpose is to have the issues to be tried
clearly framed.
But it is not th6 only rule in the
- 19 -

book of Rules of Civil Procedure, They must all be
looked to in the light of their even more fundamental
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure
to the end that the parties are afforded the
privilege
of
presenting
whatever
legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.
What they are entitled to is notice of the issues
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required.
Our
rules provide for liberality to allow examination
into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue
if he so requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P., so states.
It further allows for an amendment to conform to the
proof after trial or even after judgment, and
indicates that if the ends of justice so require,
"failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues." This idea is confirmed
by Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P.: ,f[E]very final judgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
. . . The trial court not only did not abuse his
discretion in allowing the issue to be raised and
receiving the contract in evidence, but he would have
failed the plain mandate of justice had he refused to
do so.
Id. at 91 (emphasis added).

The underlying purpose of the rules of procedure was again
emphasized

by

the

Court

in

First

Security

Bank

of

Utah

Colonial Ford, 597 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1979):

[I]t could not be made plainer that the underlying
purpose of the rules is that judgment should be
granted in accordance with the law and the evidence
as the ends of justice require; and that this is true
whether the pleadings are actually amended or not.
We therefore accept defendant's position that even
though they had not pleaded the defense of mistake,
that should not preclude them from urging and relying
on that defense if that was what the interest of
justice required.
- 20 -

v.

Moreover, in Olpin v. Grove Finance Company, 521 P.2d 1221,
1223 (Utah 1974) the Court noted three exceptions to Rule 12(h),
Utah R. Civ. P., the last of which is relied upon by State Farm:

It is true, as plaintiff contends^ that this is an
affirmative defense [failure of consideration] which
is required to be pleaded, and unless it is , it
ordinarily should not be allowed as a defense, unless
there was a motion to amend, or the parties acquiesce
in the trial of that issue, or the plaintiff was
otherwise given notice and an opportunity to meet it.
(Emphasis added.)

As noted in the above quotations, it matter not whether the
pleadings are actually amended and affirmative defenses pled so
long as opposing counsel is given notice of the issue raised and
an opportunity to meet it.

This is so because justice requires

that the parties be afforded the privilege] of presenting whatever
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to the dispute.

In the case sub judice plaintiff was given notice of State
Farm's intention to rely on the contractual limitation provision
contained in the policy on June 9, 1987 whfen State Farm filed its
motion

for

summary

judgment.

(R-042).

Plaintiff

then

had

44 days, until July 23, 1987, the date of ^he hearing, to prepare
to meet the defense.

(R-lll).

Moreover, the hearing, which had

been originally scheduled for July 6, 1987, was continued until
July 23, 1987 so as to provide plaintiff With extra time to meet
the defense.

(R-049-50).

The purpose envisioned
- 21 -

by the rules

was fully complied with.

Plaintiff was given notice of the

defense and had over six weeks to prepare to meet it.

As stated

by Cheney, 381 P. 2d at 91, "When this is accomplished, that is
all that is required [by the rules]."

Plaintiff would have had

no more notice had State Farm formally moved to amend its answer.

Moreover,

the

case

of

Staker

v.

Huntington

Cleveland

Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983), cited by plaintiff, is
inapposite.
the

State Farm has not sought to raise this defense on

morning

commenced.

of
In

trial,
its

two

brief

years

after

plaintiff

the

states

litigation
that

was

"extensive

discovery" had been engaged in and that the case was "nearly
ready

for trial" when State Farm raised the defense of the

one-year

limitation

period.

See

Brief

of Appellant

at 23.

However, this is contrary to what was stated by plaintiff during
oral arguments on the motion.

See Transcript of Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment at page 21, lines 4 - 8 .

Moreover, a

notice of readiness for trial had not been filed by the plaintiff
and

only

two

depositions

had

been

taken

and

one

set

of

interrogatories and requests for production of documents drafted.
The case was still young.

Since plaintiff was given adequate notice of the defense
while the case was yet young and was provided with a six-week
opportunity to prepare to meet it. State Farm should not be
precluded

from raising

the

contractual
- 22 -

limitation

period

by

reason of its failure to affirmatively plead it.

CONCLUSION
For the fo:reg°in<? reasons State Farm respectfully requests
that this Courts affirm the order of the lower court granting
summary judgment in State Farm's favor.
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